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Abstract
We study asset price bubbles in market models with proportional transaction costs
λ ∈ (0,1) and finite time horizon T in the setting of [49]. By following [28], we define
the fundamental value F of a risky asset S as the price of a super-replicating portfolio
for a position terminating in one unit of the asset and zero cash. We then obtain a
dual representation for the fundamental value by using the super-replication theorem
of [50]. We say that an asset price has a bubble if its fundamental value differs from
the ask-price (1 + λ)S. We investigate the impact of transaction costs on asset price
bubbles and show that our model intrinsically includes the birth of a bubble.
Keywords: financial bubbles, fundamental value, super-replication, transaction costs, consistent
price systems
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study financial asset price bubbles in market models with proportional
transaction costs and finite time horizon. In the economic literature there are several
contributions discussing the impact of transaction costs on the formation of asset price
bubbles. It is apparent that bubbles may also appear in markets with big transaction
costs, see [5], [22] and also [23], [44], [54] for the speficic case of the real estate market.
Several approaches can be found in the literature to explain bubbles, like asymmetric
information, see [2], [3], heterogenous beliefs, see [27], [53], and noise trading such as
positive feedback activity [15], [55], [58], in combination with limits to arbitrage, see [1],
[14], [56], [57]. In [53], the authors include transaction costs in an equilibrium model
with heterogeneous beliefs and show that small transaction costs may reduce speculative
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trading and then prevent bubble’s formation. However, price volatility and size of the
bubble are not reduced effectively. For an overview of heterogeneous beliefs, we refer to
[61]. Also in [59], the authors show in an agent-based simulation that transaction costs
can have positive impact by stabilizing the financial market model in the long run.
From a mathematical point of view, there is a wide literature on the theory of asset bubbles
in frictionless market models. In general, a bubble is given by the difference of the market
price of the asset and its fundamental value. While the market price can be observed,
it is less obvious how to define the fundamental value. In the martingale approach, see
[12], [31], [37], [45], the fundamental value of a given asset S is given by its expectation of
future cash flows with respect to an equivalent local martingale measure. This approach
has been criticized in [24] for its sensitivity with respect to model’s choice. Another
approach defines the fundamental value of an asset by its super-replication prices, see [28],
[29]. Other approaches explain in a mathematical model the impact of microeconomic
interactions on asset price formation, see [10], [36]. In [36], the fundamental value is
exogenously given and asset price bubbles are endogenously determined by the impact of
liquidity risk. In [10], microeconomic dynamics may at an aggregate level determine a
shift in the martingale measure. Further references on asset price bubbles are [7], [8], [9],
[30], [34], [35], [52]. For a comprehensive overview see also [47] and the entry “Bubbles
and Crashes” of [42].
The aim of this paper is to introduce the notion of asset price bubble in market models
with proportional transaction costs. In [24], the authors suggest a robust definition of
asset price bubbles which can be interpreted as a bubble under proportional transaction
costs. However, to the best of our knowledge a thorough study of this topic is still missing
in the literature.
In market models with proportional transaction costs λ ∈ (0,1) we distinguish between
the ask price (1+λ)S and the bid price (1−λ)S for a given asset price S. It is well-known
that in the frictionless case the no-arbitrage condition no free lunch with vanishing risk
(NFLVR) is equivalent to the existence of an equivalent local martingale measure, see [16].
In the presence of proportional transaction costs, the existence of consistent (local) price
systems (Definition 2.1) for each λ > 0 guarantees that the corresponding market model is
arbitrage-free in the sense of Definition 4 of [26]. Equivalence is obtained for continuous
asset price processes. Furthermore, in [6], the authors establish an equivalence between
the weaker notions of strictly consistent local martingale systems and the NUPBR1 and
NLABPs2 conditions in the robust sense. Roughly speaking, a consistent (local) price
system can be thought as a dual market model without transaction costs where the trading
happens parallel. For a detailed overview of the theory of proportional transaction costs,
we refer to the books [38] and [51].
Due to the presence of transaction costs, positions in cash and in the asset are asymmetric.
By following [28], we define the fundamental value F of a given asset S as the price of a
super-replicating portfolio for a position terminating in one unit of the asset and zero cash.
More precisely, we are interested in super-replicating a position in the asset, and not in
the liquidation value of the portfolio. First we study some properties of the fundamental
1no unbounded profit with bounded risk
2no local arbitrage with bounded portfolios
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value. We establish a dual representation for F for any time t ∈ [0, T ] based on the
super-replication results from [11] and [50] and show time independence of the consistent
(local) price system in the dual representation, see Theorem 3.9. In particular, in Theorem
3.13 we prove that the fundamental value admits a ca`dla`g modification. An asset price
bubble is defined as the difference of the ask price with respect to the fundamental value.
Introducing a concept of asset price bubble for the bid price is more complex and we refer
to the discussion in Section 6. For the frictionless case, if the NFLVR condition is satisfied
in the model of [28] one can apply the duality result from [43] and obtain that there is a
bubble if and only if the price process S is a strict local martingale under all equivalent
local martingale measures. In particular, if there is at least one equivalent local martingale
measure such that S is a true martingale, there is no bubble in the market model. In our
model there is no bubble in the market model if there exists a consistent price system in
the non-local sense for any λ > 0, see Proposition 3.11.
Further, we discuss this theoretical setting in several examples. In particular, the impact
of proportional transaction costs is investigated by comparing our model to the frictionless
framework of [28]. It is immediate to see that no bubble in the frictionless market model
means no bubble in the analogous market model with transaction costs. On the other
side, if there is a bubble in the market model with proportional transaction costs, there
is also a bubble in the frictionless market model. However, if there is a bubble in the
frictionless market model, the introduction of transaction costs can possibly eliminate the
asset price bubble. Finally, we note that our definition of asset price bubble intrinsically
includes bubbles’ birth.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline the setting for market models
with proportional transaction costs and extend the notion of admissible strategies. In
Section 3, we introduce the definition of the fundamental value and of asset price bubbles,
and establish a dual representation for the fundamental value. Further, we prove the main
results, Theorem 3.9 and Theorem 3.13. In Section 4, we illustrate our results through
concrete examples. In Section 5, the impact of proportional transaction costs on bubbles’
formation and size is investigated. In Section 6, we briefly discuss bubbles for the bid price.
In the Appendix, we state the super-replication results from [50] with small modifications.
2 The Setting
Let T > 0 describe a finite time horizon and let (Ω,F , (Ft)0≤t≤T ,P) be a filtered probability
space where the filtration F ∶= (Ft)0≤t≤T satisfies the usual conditions of right-continuity
and saturatedness, with F0 = {∅,Ω} and FT = F . We consider a financial market model
consisting of a risk-free asset B, normalized to B ≡ 1, and a risky asset S. Throughout the
paper we assume that S = (St)0≤t≤T is an F-adapted stochastic process, with ca`dla`g and
positive paths. For trading the risky asset in the market model, proportional transaction
costs 0 < λ < 1 are charged, i.e., to buy one share of S at time t the trader has to pay
(1+λ)St and for selling one share of S at time t the trader receives (1−λ)St. The interval[(1 − λ)St, (1 + λ)St] is called bid-ask-spread. Further, we assume that St ∈ L1+(Ft,P) for
all t ∈ [0, T ]. This assumption is needed in the proof of Lemma 3.6 and thus also for the
main result, Theorem 3.9.
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Definition 2.1. For λ > 0 and a stopping time 0 ≤ σ < τ ≤ T , we call CPS(σ, τ) (resp.
CPSloc(σ, τ)) the family of pairs (Q, S˜Q) such that Q is a probability measure on Fτ ,
Q ∼ P∣Fτ , S˜Q is a martingale (resp. local martingale) under Q on ⟦σ, τ⟧, and
(1 − λ)St ≤ S˜Qt ≤ (1 + λ)St, for σ ≤ t ≤ τ. (2.1)
A pair (Q, S˜Q) in CPS(σ, τ) (resp. CPSloc(σ, τ)) is called consistent price system (resp.
consistent local price system). By Q(σ,T ) (resp. Qloc(σ,T )) we denote the set of measures
Q such that there exists a pair (Q, S˜Q) ∈ CPS(σ,T ) (resp. (Q, S˜Q) ∈ CPSloc(σ,T )). Fur-
ther, we write Lp(Fσ,Q) ∶= ⋂Q∈Q(σ,T )Lp(Fσ,Q) and Lp(Fσ ,Qloc) ∶= ⋂Q∈Qloc(σ,T )Lp(Fσ,Q).
By Lp+(Fσ,Qloc) (resp. Lp+(Fσ ,Q)) we denote the space of [0,∞)-valued random variables
X ∈ Lp(Fσ,Qloc) (resp. X ∈ Lp(Fσ,Q)).
A consistent (local) price system can be thought as a frictionless market with better
conditions for traders, see [25]. The existence of a λ-consistent (local) price system for
every 0 < λ < 1 implies that the corresponding market model is arbitrage-free in the sense
of Definition 4 of [26]. Considering consistent price systems in the non-local or local
sense corresponds in the frictionless case to the characterization of no arbitrage using true
martingales or local martingales. In both cases the difference lies in the choice of admissible
trading strategies. If there is no natural nume´raire it seems reasonable to compare the
portfolio with positions which may be short in each asset. On the other hand, if we fix
a nume´raire we control the portfolio only in units of the nume´raire. In particular, we do
not allow short positions in the risky asset. See Chapter 5 of [26] for a more detailed
discussion. For the convenience of the reader we summarize the assumptions that we use
through out the survey.
Assumption 1. We assume that S admits a consistent local price system for every 0 <
λ′ ≤ λ.
In the sequel we will sometimes need a stronger assumption, namely, the existence of
consistent price systems (in the non-local sense) for every 0 < λ′ ≤ λ.
Assumption 2. We assume that S admits a consistent price system for every 0 < λ′ ≤ λ.
Remark 2.2. We first note for every (Q, S˜Q) ∈ CPSloc(0, T ), then S˜Qt ∈ L1+(Ft,Q) because
S˜Q is a Q-supermartingale.
Furthermore, Assumption 1 guarantees that for any t ∈ [0, T ], St ∈ L1(Ft,Qloc), as (2.1)
implies
St ≤
1
1 − λS˜Qt , ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
for any (Q, S˜Q) ∈ CPSloc(0, T ).
By following [26], [39], for λ > 0 we denote by Kλt the solvency cone at time t, defined as
Kλt = cone{(1 + λ)Ste1 − e2,−e1 + 1(1 − λ)St e2} , (2.2)
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where e1 = (1,0), e2 = (0,1) are the unit vectors in R2, and by (−Kλt )○ the corresponding
polar cone, given by
(−Kλt )○ = {(w1,w2) ∈ R2+ ∣ (1 − λ)St ≤ w2
w1
≤ (1 + λ)St}
= {w ∈ R2 ∣ ⟨x,w⟩ ≤ 0,∀x ∈ (−Kλt )} .
(2.3)
Definition 2.3. We defineZ(σ, τ) (resp. Zloc(σ, τ)) as the set of processes Z = (Z1t ,Z2t )σ≤t≤τ
such that Z1 is a P-martingale on ⟦σ, τ⟧ and Z2 is a P-martingale (resp. local P-
martingale) on ⟦σ, τ⟧ and such that Zt ∈ (−Kλt )○/{0} a.s. for all t ∈ ⟦σ, τ⟧.
The following proposition from [26] provides a convenient representation of consistent
(local) price systems by elements in Z (resp. Zloc) and follows directly from the definition
of (−Kλt )○ in (2.3).
Proposition 2.4 (Proposition 3, [26]). Let Z = (Z1t ,Z2t )σ≤t≤T be a 2-dimensional stochas-
tic process with Z1τ ∈ L
1(Fτ ,P). Define the measure Q(Z)≪ P by dQ(Z)/dP ∶= Z1τ /E[Z1τ ].
Then Z ∈ Z(σ, τ) (resp. Z ∈ Zloc(σ, τ)) if and only if (Q(Z), (Z2/Z1)) is a consistent
price system (resp. consistent local price system) on ⟦σ, τ⟧.
Next, we introduce the notion of self-financing strategies and admissibility, by extending
Definition 3 and 5 of [49] to a general starting value.
Definition 2.5. Let 0 < λ < 1. A self-financing trading strategy starting with initial en-
dowment Xσ ∈ L
0
+(Fσ,P) is a pair of F-predictable finite variation processes (ϕ1t , ϕ2t )σ≤t≤T
on ⟦σ,T ⟧ such that
(i) ϕ1σ =Xσ and ϕ
2
σ = 0,
(ii) denoting by ϕ1t = ϕ
1
σ +ϕ1,↑t −ϕ1,↓t and ϕ2t = ϕ2,↑t −ϕ2,↓t , the Jordan-Hahn decomposition
of ϕ1 and ϕ2 into the difference of two non-decreasing processes, starting at ϕ1,↑σ =
ϕ
1,↓
σ = ϕ
2,↑
σ = ϕ
2,↓
σ = 0, these processes satisfy
dϕ1t ≤ (1 − λ)Stdϕ2,↓t − (1 + λ)Stdϕ2,↑t , σ ≤ t ≤ T. (2.4)
Definition 2.6. Let 0 < λ < 1.
(i) Let Xσ ∈ L
1
+(Fσ,Qloc). Then a self-financing trading strategy ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2) is called
admissible in a nume´raire-based sense on ⟦σ,T ⟧ with ϕ1σ = Xσ if there is Mσ ∈
L1+(Fσ ,Qloc) such that the liquidation value V liqτ satisfies
V liqτ (ϕ1, ϕ2) ∶= ϕ1τ + (ϕ2τ )+ (1 − λ)Sτ − (ϕ2τ)− (1 + λ)Sτ ≥ −Mσ, (2.5)
for all ⟦σ,T ⟧-valued stopping times τ .
(ii) Let Xσ ∈ L
1
+(Fσ ,Q). Then a self-financing trading strategy ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2) is called
admissible in a nume´raire-free sense on ⟦σ,T ⟧ with ϕ1σ = Xσ if there is (M1σ ,M2σ) ∈
L1+(Fσ ,Q) ×L∞+ (Fσ ,Q) such that
V liqτ (ϕ1, ϕ2) ∶= ϕ1τ + (ϕ2τ)+ (1 − λ)Sτ − (ϕ2τ)− (1 + λ)Sτ ≥ −M1σ −M2σSτ , (2.6)
for all ⟦σ,T ⟧-valued stopping times τ .
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We denote by VM(Xσ , σ, T,λ) (resp. V locM (Xσ, σ, T,λ)) the set of all such trading strategies
in the nume´raire-free sense (resp. nume´raire-based sense) ϕ on the interval ⟦σ,T ⟧. We also
use the notation Vσ,T (Xσ, λ) = ⋃M VM(Xσ , σ, T,λ) (resp. V locXσ ,σ,T (λ) = ⋃M V locM (Xσ , σ, T,λ)).
For more details on the differential form of (2.4) we refer the interested reader to [49].
Note that both accounts, the holdings in the bond ϕ1 as well as the holdings in the asset
ϕ2 are separately given in the definition of a trading strategy ϕ. Having an inequality
in (2.4) allows for “throwing money away”, see [49]. As it is explained in [49] we could
require equality in (2.4) in order to express ϕ1 in terms of ϕ2. However, for our approach
it is more convenient to specify both accounts separately.
Remark 2.7. We now discuss the definition of admissible strategies. Since we are in-
terested in considering strategies on a random interval with non-zero initial endowment,
we need to extend Definitions 3 and 5 of [49], as we now explain for the nume´raire-based
case. The argument for the nume´raire-free setting is analogous. In a first step we consider
the case of zero initial endowments. Assume that ϕσ = (0,0) and V liqτ (ϕ) ≥ −M for all⟦σ,T ⟧-valued stopping times τ and a constant M > 0. Then ϕ corresponds to a admissible
strategy ψ on [0, T ] according to Definition 3 of [49], where (ψ1, ψ2) ≡ (0,0) on ⟦0, σ⟧
and ψt = ϕt for all t ≥ σ. Conversely, any strategy ψ on [0, T ] with (ψ1, ψ2) ≡ (0,0) on⟦0, σ⟧, which is admissible in a nume´raire-based sense in the sense of [49], also satisfies
Definition 2.6. Suppose now to have a non-zero initial endowment. By translation, any
admissible strategy on [0, T ] with initial endowments corresponds to an admissible strategy
on [0, T ] without initial endowment. This correspondence is more delicate for strategies on
⟦σ,T ⟧. Let ϕσ = (Xσ,0) for some Xσ ∈ L1+(Fσ,Qloc) with V liqτ (ϕ) ≥ −M and define ϕ˜t =(ϕ˜1t , ϕ˜2t ) ∶= (ϕt −Xσ, ϕt) for all σ ≤ t ≤ T . Then V liqτ (ϕ˜) = V liqτ (ϕ)−Xσ ≥ −M −Xσ =∶ −Mσ.
Hence, it is not enough to bound the liquidation value of a strategy by a constant in order
to have a one-to-one correspondence of admissible strategies with and without endowments
on ⟦σ,T ⟧. Definition 2.6 allows to obtain from any admissible strategy ψ on [0, T ] an
admissible strategy ϕ ∶= ψ∣⟦σ,T ⟧ on ⟦σ,T ⟧. Note that in the case of σ = 0 Definition 2.6 and
Definition 3 of [49] coincide.
When we consider the definition of admissibility in a nume´raire-based sense on [0, T ] from
an economical perspective, the role of M > 0 is to hedge the portfolio by M units of the
bond, see [49]. In particular, when we superhedge a portfolio on ⟦σ,T ⟧, it seems reason-
able to use the information which are available up to time σ, namely, to superhedge the
portfolio by Mσ units of the bond, where Mσ ∈ L
1
+(Fσ ,Qloc).
We now comment on the integrability conditions of the lower bound Mσ.
Remark 2.8. We discuss the local and the non-local case separately. In Definition 3
of [49] the liquidation value of an admissible strategy in the nume´raire-based sense ϕ =
(ϕ1t , ϕ2t )t∈[0,T ] is required to be lower bounded by a constant. This guarantees that (ϕ1t +
ϕ2t S˜
Q
t )t∈[0,T ] is an optional strong Q-supermartingale for all (Q, S˜Q) ∈ CPSloc(0, T ), see
Proposition 2 of [49].
As explained in Remark 2.7 we wish to extend the definitions of [49] to include admissible
strategies on an arbitrary interval with arbitrary initial endowment. To this propose we
need to impose condition (2.5). However, we still obtain an arbitrage-free market model.
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In the proof of Proposition 2 of [49] the lower bound is used to apply Proposition 3.3 of [4],
respectively Theorem 1 of [60]. The conditions of these results are still fulfilled on ⟦σ,T ⟧
if (2.5) holds, and thus (ϕ1t +ϕ2t S˜Qt )σ≤t≤T is an optional strong Q-supermartingale for all(Q, S˜Q) ∈ CPSloc(σ,T ).
In the non-local case, Definition 5 of [49] requires that the liquidation value of an admissible
strategy in the nume´raire-free sense ϕ = (ϕ1t , ϕ2t )t∈[0,T ] satisfies
Vτ(ϕ1, ϕ2) ≥ −M(1 + Sτ), (2.7)
for all [0, T ]-valued stopping times τ . This guarantees that (ϕ1t +ϕ2t S˜Qt )t∈[0,T ] is an optional
strong Q-supermartingale for all (Q, S˜Q) ∈ CPS(0, T ), see Proposition 3 of [49]. Following
the proof of Proposition 3 of [49], we apply the following conditional version of Fatou’s
lemma. Let (Xn)n∈N be a sequence of real-valued random variables on (Ω,F ,Q) converging
almost surely to X and such that the negative parts (X−n)n∈N are uniformly Q-integrable.
Then
EQ [lim inf
n→∞
Xn ∣ G] ≤ lim inf
n→∞
EQ [Xn ∣ G] .
In our case, the family {(ϕ1τ + ϕ2τ S˜Qτ )− ∶ σ ≤ τ ≤ T} is uniformly Q-integrable with respect
to Q for all (Q, S˜Q) ∈ CPS(σ,T ), as we have for σ ≤ τ ≤ T
ϕ1τ + ϕ2τ S˜Qτ ≥ V liqτ (ϕ1, ϕ2) ≥ −M1σ −M2σSτ ,
because Sτ ≤
1
1−λ S˜
Q
τ for any (Q, S˜Q) ∈ CPS(0, T ) and S˜Q is a Q-martingale, and (M1σ ,M2σ) ∈
L1+(Fσ,Q)×L∞+ (Fσ ,Q) by assumption. Therefore, (ϕ1t +ϕ2t S˜Qt )σ≤t≤T is an optional strong
Q-supermartingale on ⟦σ,T ⟧ for all (Q, S˜Q) ∈ CPS(σ,T ) and all trading strategies ϕ =
(ϕ1t , ϕ2t )σ≤t≤T are admissible in a nume´raire-free sense.
3 Asset price bubbles under proportional transaction costs
The notion of an asset price bubble consists of two components, namely, the market price
of an asset and its fundamental value. We assume that the market price is given by the
price process S. For the fundamental value of an asset, we here follow the approach of
[28] and define the fundamental value by means of the super-replication price of the asset.
In frictionless market models, it is equivalent to hold the asset or to have the (market)
value of the asset in the money market account. This symmetry fails in the presence
of transaction costs. A trader who wants to buy a share of the asset at time t ∈ [0, T ]
has to pay (1 + λ)St. A trader who wants to liquidate her position in the asset at time
t ∈ [0, T ] only receives (1−λ)St per share of the asset. Therefore, a natural question arises.
Which position should we super-replicate in order to obtain a reasonable definition of the
fundamental value in the presence of transaction costs?
Definition 3.1. The fundamental value F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] of an asset S at time t ∈ [0, T ] in
a market model with proportional transaction costs 0 < λ < 1 is defined by
Ft ∶= ess inf {Xt ∈ L1+(Ft,Qloc) ∶ ∃ϕ ∈ V loct,T (Xt, λ) with ϕt = (Xt,0) and ϕT = (0,1)} .
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We say there is an asset price bubble in the market model with transaction costs if P(Fσ <(1 + λ)Sσ) > 0 for some stopping time σ with values in [0, T ]. We define the asset price
bubble as the process β = (βt)0≤t≤T given by
βt ∶= (1 + λ)St − Ft, t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.1)
Remark 3.2. In Definition 4.2 of [24], the authors provide a robust definition of an as-
set price bubble, which can also be interpreted as a bubble under proportional transaction
costs. A difference with respect to Definition 3.1 lies in the chosen specification of trading
strategies. In [24], in the worst case scenario the strategy begins in cash, but the initial
capital is all in stock, or analogously, the strategy ends in cash, but the trader has to deliver
one share of the asset.
Specifying both components of the trading strategies in our model allows to consider strate-
gies starting in cash and ending in a position in the stock only.
Proposition 3.3. Under Assumption 1, we have that the fundamental value F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ]
is such that
Ft ≤ (1 + λ)St, t ∈ [0, T ],
and Ft ∈ L
1(Ft,Qloc), t ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover, the bubble β = (βt)t∈[0,T ] has almost surely
non-negative paths.
Proof. Consider the buy and hold strategy starting at time t ∈ [0, T ]. With an initial
endowment ϕt = ((1 + λ)St,0) it is possible to buy one share of the asset at time t and
keep it until time T . Then Ft ≤ (1+λ)St for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore, the bubble has almost
surely non-negative paths. The fact that Fσ ∈ L
1
+(Fσ ,Qloc) follows by Remark 2.2.
We now comment on Definition 3.1, which could be interpreted as the fundamental
value for the ask price. Alternatively, we could consider to super-replicate the position
ϕT = ((1 − λ)ST ,0) which is the liquidation value of the asset S at time T , instead, or
ϕT = ((1 + λ)ST ,0) which is the price one has to pay to buy the asset at time T . A
trader who wants to super-replicate ((1 − λ)ST ,0) is only interested in cash, namely, in
the liquidation value of the asset. However, it is not possible to re-buy at T a share of
the asset at price (1 − λ)ST . On the other hand, a trader who wants to super-replicate((1 + λ)ST ,0) is actually interested in having the asset at T in the portfolio. So, super-
replicating ((1 + λ)ST ,0) might be too expensive. Therefore, we consider the position
ϕT = (0,1) and its corresponding super-replication price as fundamental value. This cor-
responds to the price a trader is willing to pay if she had to hold the asset in her portfolio
until the terminal time T , see [32]. As in [28] this definition allows bubble birth, see [7].
We give an explicit example in Example 4.7.
In a frictionless market model there are well-known super-replication theorems which es-
tablish a dual representation, see e.g. [19], [43]. Analogously there are super-replication
theorems for market models with proportional transaction costs to obtain a dual represen-
tation, see e.g. [13], [39], [41], [40]. We refer to the super-replication theorems of [11] and
[50]. The formulations of Theorem 1.4 and Theorem 1.5 of [50] can be found in Appendix
A.
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Proposition 3.4. Let Assumption 1 hold. We consider an FT -measurable contingent
claim XT = (X1T ,X2T ) which pays X1T many units of the bond and X2T many units of the
risky asset at time T . Let Xσ ∈ L
1
+(Fσ,Qloc). If
X1T −Xσ + (X2T )+ (1 − λ)ST − (X2T )− (1 + λ)ST ≥ −Mσ, (3.2)
for some Fσ-measurable random variable Mσ satisfying supQ∈Qloc EQ[Mσ] < ∞, then the
following assertions are equivalent
(i) There is a self-financing trading strategy ϕ on ⟦σ,T ⟧ with ϕσ = (Xσ,0) and ϕT =(X1T ,X2T ) which is admissible in a nume´raire-based sense.
(ii) For every (Q, S˜Q) ∈ CPSloc(σ,T ) we have
EQ [X1T −Xσ +X2T S˜QT ∣ Fσ] ≤ 0. (3.3)
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii) It is possible to apply Proposition 2 of [49] although we consider the
interval ⟦σ,T ⟧ and initial endowment ϕσ = (Xσ ,0), see Remark 2.8. Then (ϕ1t +ϕ2t S˜Qt )σ≤t≤T
is an optional strong supermartingale and thus
EQ [X1T −Xσ +X2T S˜QT ∣ Fσ] = EQ [ϕ1T −Xσ +ϕ2T S˜QT ∣ Fσ] ≤ ϕ1σ −Xσ + ϕ2σS˜Qσ = 0.
(ii) ⇒ (i) For
X˜T ∶= (X1T −Xσ +Mσ − sup
Q∈Q
EQ [Mσ] ,X2T) ,
we have
X˜1T + (X˜2T )+ (1 − λ)ST − (X˜2T )− (1 + λ)ST ≥ − sup
Q∈Q
EQ [Mσ] , (3.4)
by equation (3.2), and for (Q, S˜Q) ∈ CPS(σ,T ) we get
EQ [X˜T + X˜2T S˜QT ] = EQ [X1T −Xσ +X2T S˜QT ] +EQ [Mσ] − sup
Q∈Q
EQ [Mσ] ≤ 0, (3.5)
by equation (3.3). Thus we can apply Theorem A.1 (Theorem 1.4 of [50]) which yields
a strategy ϕ˜ with ϕ˜ ≡ 0 on ⟦0, σ⟧ and ϕ˜T = X˜T which is admissible in a nume´raire-based
sense on [0, T ]. In particular, ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2) defined by ϕ1t ∶= ϕ˜1t +Xσ−Mσ+supQ∈QEQ [Mσ]
and ϕ2t ∶= ϕ˜t2 for σ ≤ t ≤ T , is an admissible strategy in the nume´raire-based sense on ⟦σ,T ⟧
according to Definition 2.6.
From Proposition 3.4 we obtain a duality representation for the fundamental value.
Proposition 3.5. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then the fundamental value F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] of
the asset S at time t ∈ [0, T ] is given by
Ft = ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc(t,T,λ)
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Ft] , (3.6)
for t ∈ [0, T ].
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Proof. For XT = (0,1) and Xt ∈ L1+(Ft,Qloc), condition (3.2) is satisfied and we get by
Proposition 3.4 that
{Xt ∈ L1+(Ft,Qloc) ∶ ∃ϕ ∈ V loct,T (Xt, λ) with ϕt = (Xt,0) and ϕT = (0,1)}
={Xt ∈ L1+(Ft,Qloc) ∶ EQ [S˜QT ∣ Ft] ≤Xt, for all (Q, S˜Q) ∈ CPSloc(t, T,λ)} =∶Dt. (3.7)
By Definition 3.1 and (3.7) we have that
Ft = ess infDt, t ∈ [0, T ].
It is left to show that
ess infDt = ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc(t,T,λ)
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Ft] . (3.8)
For the first direction “≤” we note that ess sup(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc(t,T,λ)EQ[S˜QT ∣ Ft] ∈ Dt, where
we used that ess sup(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc(t,T,λ)EQ[S˜QT ∣ Ft] ≤ (1 + λ)St ∈ L1(Ft,Qloc).
For the reverse direction “≥” we have that ess infDt ≥ EQ[S˜QT ∣ Ft] for all (Q, S˜Q) ∈
CPSloc(t, T,λ) which implies by the definition of the essential supremum that
ess infDt ≥ ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc(t,T,λ)
EQ[S˜QT ∣ Ft].
Note that in the above proof t ∈ [0, T ] can be replaced by a stopping time 0 ≤ σ ≤ T .
In Proposition 3.5 the essential supremum is taken over the set CPSloc(t, T,λ) which
depends on the initial time t. In contrast, if we consider the frictionless case of [28] and
assume that Theorem 3.2 from [43] applies, the fundamental value S∗σ of an asset S at
time σ is given by
S∗σ = ess sup
Q∈Mloc(S)
EQ [ST ∣ Fσ] ,
whereMloc(S) denotes the set of equivalent local martingale measures for S. The essential
supremum is taken over all equivalent local martingale measure of S, independently of the
initial time σ. We now show that a similar independence property also holds for the
fundamental value under transaction costs, see Theorem 3.9. In order to prove it, we need
some preliminary results. We start with a local version of Lemma 6 and Corollary 3 of
[26].
Lemma 3.6. Let Assumption 1 hold. For each stopping time 0 ≤ σ ≤ T and each random
variable f ∈ L1(Fσ,P) such that
(1 − λ)Sσ < f < (1 + λ)Sσ, (3.9)
and for each λ¯ > λ there is an λ¯-consistent local price system (Qˇ, Sˇ) ∈ CPSloc(0, T, λ¯) with
Sˇσ = f .
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Proof. The proof is partially based3 on the proof of Lemma 6 of [26]. Consider the sequence
of stopping time (τn)n∈N, where
τn(ω) ∶= inf{t ≥ 0 ∣ St(ω) ≥ n} ∧ T.
Note that (τn)n∈N defines a localizing sequence for all λ-consistent local price systems as
for (Q, S˜Q) ∈ CPS(0, T, λ) we have
S˜
Q
t ≤ (1 + λ)St ≤ (1 + λ)n, (3.10)
for all 0 ≤ t < τn and hence Proposition 6.1 of [50] can be applied. Further, it holds that
τn ↑ T a.s. Fix λ¯ > λ. First we consider the interval ⟦0, σ⟧. Choose δ ≤ λ such that
δ + (1 + δ)(λ + δ)/(1 − δ) < λ¯. By Assumption 1 there exists (Q(δ), S˜(δ)) ∈ CPSloc(0, σ, δ)
a δ-consistent local price system on the interval ⟦0, σ⟧. We have
1 − δ ≤ S˜τn∧σ(δ)
Sτn∧σ
≤ 1 + δ. (3.11)
For n ∈ N define
fn ∶=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
f on {τn ≥ σ},
S˜(δ)τn on {τn < σ}.
Hence by (3.10) we get fn ∈ L
1(Fτn∧σ,P), and for hn ∶= fn/Sτn∧σ we have
1 − λ < hn < 1 + λ,
and
∣S˜τn∧σ(δ) − fn∣ < (λ + δ)Sτn∧σ ≤ λ + δ1 − δ S˜τn∧σ(δ).
This implies that fn ∈ L
1(Fτn∧σ,Q(δ)) as well as f ∈ L1(Fσ,Q(δ)) by (3.9) and the fact
that
f ≤ (1 + λ)Sσ ≤ 1 + λ
1 − λS˜σ(δ).
Consequently, for S¯nρ ∶= EQ(δ)[fn ∣ Fρ] and a stopping time ρ with 0 ≤ ρ ≤ (τn ∧ σ),
∣EQ(δ) [fn ∣ Fρ] − EQ(δ) [S˜τn∧σ(δ) ∣ Fρ]∣ < S˜ρ(δ)λ + δ1 − δ ≤ Sρ
(λ + δ)(1 + δ)
1 − δ ,
thus using (3.11) we get
(1 − λ¯)Sρ < S¯nρ < (1 + λ¯)Sρ. (3.12)
We show that S¯nρ converges almost surely to a random variable S¯
Q(δ)
ρ for all 0 ≤ ρ ≤ σ. We
have that
EQ(δ) [fn ∣ Fρ] = EQ(δ) [1{τn≥σ}f ∣ Fρ] + EQ(δ) [1{τn<σ}S˜τn(δ) ∣ Fρ] .
3The main difference with respect to the proof of Lemma 6 of [26] is that we cannot use the martingale
property of consistent price systems as in [26], because we are now in the local setting. Hence we need
some further technicalities.
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By the Theorem of Monotone Convergence it follows that
EQ(δ) [1{τn≥σ}f ∣ Fρ] a.s.Ð→ EQ(δ) [f ∣ Fρ] . (3.13)
For the second term we have
EQ(δ) [1{τn<σ}S˜τn(δ) ∣ Fρ] = EQ(δ) [S˜τn∧σ(δ) ∣ Fρ] − EQ(δ) [1{τn≥σ}S˜τn∧σ(δ) ∣ Fρ]
= S˜τn∧ρ(δ) − EQ(δ) [1{τn≥σ}S˜σ(δ) ∣ Fρ] .
Since 1{τn≥σ} ≤ 1{τn+1≥σ} for all n ∈ N, we can apply the Theorem of Monotone Convergence
to conclude
S¯nρ
a.s.Ð→ EQ(δ) [f ∣ Fρ] + S˜ρ(δ) −EQ(δ) [S˜σ(δ) ∣ Fρ] =∶ S¯Q(δ)ρ . (3.14)
We define the process S¯Q(δ) = (S¯Q(δ)t )0≤t≤σ by (3.14). Since
(EQ(δ) [f ∣ Ft] −EQ(δ) [S˜σ(δ) ∣ Ft])0≤t≤σ
is a Q(δ)-martingale, it admits a unique ca`dla`g modification. Further, S˜(δ) has a unique
ca`dla`g modification. Therefore, S¯Q(δ) admits a unique ca`dla`g modification as a local
Q(δ)-martingale. By (3.12) S¯Q(δ) lies in the bid-ask spread for λ¯ by construction. Thus
(Q(δ), S¯Q(δ)) is a λ¯-consistent local price system on ⟦0, σ⟧ satisfying S¯Q(δ)σ = f . With the
same construction as in the proof of Lemma 6 of [26] we can now show the existence of a
consistent local price system (Q̂, Ŝ) ∈ CPSloc(σ,T, λ¯) such that Ŝσ = f . We refer to [48]
for further details. We use this result to extend (Q(δ), S¯Q(δ)) to a consistent local price
system (Qˇ, Sˇ) ∈ CPSloc(0, T, λ¯) on the entire interval [0, T ].
We now define (Qˇ, Sˇ) ∈ CPSloc(0, T, λ¯)) which satisfies Sˇσ = f . Set Qˇ by
dQˇ
dP
∶=
dQ(δ)
dP
EP [dQ̂dP ∣ Fσ]
dQ̂
dP
,
and
Sˇt ∶=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
S¯
Q(δ)
t , for 0 ≤ t ≤ σ
Ŝt, for σ ≤ t ≤ T.
Then (Qˇ, Sˇ) ∈ CPSloc(0, T, λ¯) and Sˇσ = Ŝσ = S¯Q(δ)σ = f .
Remark 3.7. Note that in the case of a consistent price system in the non-local sense,
Lemma 3.6 coincides with Lemma 6 of [26].
The following Corollary 3.8 can be proved in the same way as Corollary 3 in [26] because
the construction does not use the martingale property of the consistent price systems.
Corollary 3.8. Let Assumption 1 hold. For any stopping time 0 ≤ σ ≤ T , probability
measure Q ∼ P∣Fσ on Fσ and random variable f ∈ L1(Fσ,P) with
(1 − λ)Sσ ≤ f ≤ (1 + λ)Sσ,
there exists a λ-consistent local price system (Q, S˜Q) ∈ CPSloc(σ,T,λ) such that S˜Qσ = f
and Q∣Fσ =Q.
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We can now show time independence for the essential supremum in the definition of the
fundamental value.
Theorem 3.9. Under Assumption 1 the following identity holds:
ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc(σ,T )
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ] = ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc(0,T )
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ] .
Proof. 1) If (Q, S˜Q) ∈ CPSloc(0, T ), then (Q, S˜Q∣⟦σ,T ⟧) ∈ CPSloc(σ,T ). Thus, CPSloc(0, T ) ⊆
CPSloc(σ,T ) we immediately get that
ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc(σ,T )
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ] ≥ ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc(0,T )
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ] .
2) Let λn ∶= λ + 1n for n ∈ N. Note that there is n0 ∈ N such that λn0 < 1. Fix (Q, S˜Q) ∈
CPSloc(σ,T,λ) with Z˜1, Z˜2 be the associated (local) P-martingales as in Proposition 2.4.
Let n ≥ n0. By Lemma 3.6 and Corollary 3.8 there exists (Q, S¯Q¯) ∈ CPSloc(0, T, λn) such
that S¯nσ = S˜
Q
σ . Let Z¯
1, Z¯2 be the associated (local) P-martingales as in Proposition 2.4.
We define a λn-consistent local price system (Q̂, ŜQ̂) ∈ CPSloc(0, T, λn) by
Ẑit ∶=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
Z¯it , 0 ≤ t ≤ σ,
Z˜it
Z¯iσ
Z˜iσ
, σ ≤ t ≤ T,
for i = 1,2. By construction it then holds that Ŝt = S˜
Q
t for all t ≥ σ and
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ] = EP [Z˜2T ∣ Fσ] (Z˜1σ)−1 = EP [Z˜2T Z¯
2
σ
Z˜2σ
∣ Fσ] (Z˜1σ)−1 Ẑ
1
σ
Ẑ1σ
Z˜2σ
Z¯2σ
= EP [Ẑ2T ∣ Fσ] 1
Z˜1σ
Z¯1σ
Z¯1σ
Z˜2σ
Z¯2σ
= EP [Ẑ2T ∣ Fσ] (Z¯1σ)−1 S˜
Q
σ
S¯
Q¯
σ
= EP [Ẑ2T ∣ Fσ] (Z¯1σ)−1 = EQ̂ [ŜQ̂T ∣ Fσ] .
Since (Q, S˜Q) ∈ CPSloc(σ,T,λ) and n ∈ N are arbitrary, we can conclude that for all n ∈ N
Fn ∶= ess sup
(Q̂,ŜQ̂)∈CPSloc(0,T,λn)
E
Q̂
[ŜQ̂
T
∣ Fσ] ≥ ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc(σ,T,λ)
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ] . (3.15)
In particular, as the right hand side does not depend on n ∈ N we get
lim
n→∞
Fn ≥ ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc(σ,T,λ)
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ] . (3.16)
The limit is well defined because the sequence is monotonically decreasing and is lower
dominated by (3.15), as CPSloc(σ,T,λn) ⊇ CPSloc(σ,T,λn+1) ⊇ CPSloc(σ,T,λ). Then
F ∶= limn→∞Fn is of the form
F = ess sup
(Q̂,ŜQ̂)∈⋂n∈NCPSloc(0,T,λn)
E
Q̂
[ŜQ̂
T
∣ Fσ] . (3.17)
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It is left to show that ⋂n∈NCPSloc(0, T, λn) = CPSloc(0, T, λ). The first implication fol-
lows directly because CPSloc(0, T, λ) ⊆ CPSloc(0, T, λn) for all n ∈ N. Hence we get
CPSloc(0, T, λ) ⊆ ⋂n∈NCPSloc(0, T, λn). For the reverse implication let
(Q̂, ŜQ̂) ∈ ⋂
n∈N
CPSloc(0, T, λn).
By definition we have for each t ∈ [0, T ]
(1 − (λ + 1
n
))St ≤ ŜQ̂t ≤ (1 + λ + 1n)St, ∀n ∈ N.
However, this can only be true if (Q̂, ŜQ̂) ∈ CPS(0, T, λ) which yields the reverse implica-
tion. Putting (3.16) and (3.17) together we obtain
ess sup
(Q̂,ŜQ̂)∈CPSloc(0,T,λ)
E
Q̂
[ŜQ̂
T
∣ Fσ] = F ≥ ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc(σ,T,λ)
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ] . (3.18)
3.1 Properties of the fundamental value and asset price bubbles
In this section we study some basic properties of the fundamental value and of asset price
bubbles in our setting.
Lemma 3.10. The process F˜ = (F˜t)t∈[0,T ] defined by
F˜t ∶= ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPS(0,T,λ)
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Ft] , t ∈ [0, T ], (3.19)
is unique to within evanescent processes.
Proof. Since Proposition 3.4 and Theorem 3.9 hold for all stopping times 0 ≤ σ ≤ T this
follows directly from the Optional Cross-Section Theorem, see Theorem 86 in Chapter IV
of [17].
Proposition 3.11. Let Assumption 2 hold. Then we have for all stopping times 0 ≤ σ ≤ T
that
ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPS(0,T,λ)
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ] = (1 + λ)Sσ.
In particular, there is no asset price bubble in the market model.
Proof. Let n0 ∈ N such that
1
n0
≤ λ. By Assumption 2 there exists a (Qn, S˜n) ∈ CPS(0, T, 1
n
)
for all n ∈ N/{0}. Define µn ∶= 1+λ
1+ 1
n
for n ≥ n0. Then (Qn, µnS˜n) ∈ CPS(0, T, λ) for all
n ≥ n0, since for t ∈ [0, T ] we have
(1 − λ)St ≤ (1 − 1
n
)St ≤ S˜nt ≤ µnS˜nt ≤ µn (1 + 1n)St = (1 + λ)St.
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Further, it holds
(1 + λ)Sσ ≥ ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPS(0,T,λ)
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ] ≥ ess sup
n≥n0
EQn [µnS˜nT ∣ Fσ] = ess sup
n≥n0
µnS˜
n
σ ,
where we have used the martingale property of (Qn, µnS˜n) ∈ CPS(0, T, λ). For the essen-
tial supremum we get
∣(1 + λ)Sσ − ess sup
n≥n0
µnS˜
n
σ ∣ ≤ ∣(1 + λ)Sσ − ess sup
n≥n0
µn (1 − 1
n
)Sσ∣
= ∣(1 + λ)Sσ (1 − ess sup
n≥n0
1 − 1
n
1 + 1
n
)∣ = 0.
Hence we can conclude that
ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPS(0,T,λ)
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ] = (1 + λ)Sσ.
Lemma 3.12. If the asset price S = (St)t∈[0,T ] is a semimartingale and the set Mloc(S)
of equivalent local martingale measures for S is not empty, then (Q, µS) ∈ CPSloc(0, T )
for Q ∈ Mloc(S) and µ ∈ [1 − λ,1 + λ], and
Fσ = ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ] ≥ ess sup
Q∈Mloc(S)
EQ [µST ∣ Fσ] . (3.20)
Proof. Equation (3.20) immediately follows by the observation that
{(Q, µS) ∶Q ∈Mloc(S), µ ∈ [1 − λ,1 + λ]} ⊂ CPSloc(0, T ). (3.21)
Theorem 3.13. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then F˜ = (F˜t)t∈[0,T ] defined in (3.19)
admits a ca`dla`g modification with respect to P.
Proof. We first show that F˜ admits a ca`dla`g modification with respect to some Q0 ∈
Qloc(0, T ). Since P and Q0 are equivalent we can conclude that F˜ has also a ca`dla`g
modification with respect to P.
By Theorem 48 in [18], F˜ admits a ca`dla`g modification with respect to Q0 if and only if for
every uniformly bounded increasing sequence (αn)n∈N of stopping times limn→∞EQ0 [F˜αn]
exists and if limn→∞EQ0 [F˜βn] = EQ0 [F˜limn→∞ βn] for every decreasing sequence (βn)n∈N
of bounded stopping times. For convenience, we write CPSloc = CPSloc(0, T, λ) and Zloc =
Zloc(0, T, λ) in the sequel. Note that we use the representation of (Q, S˜Q) ∈ CPSloc from
Proposition 2.4. Fix some Q0 ∈ Qloc. As in Proposition 4.3 of [43] we first show the
identity
EQ0
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ]
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPS
EQ0 [EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ]] , (3.22)
15
for all stopping times σ with values in [0, T ]. For the first direction we use monotonicity
to obtain
EQ
0
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ]
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
≥ sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc
EQ
0
[EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ]] . (3.23)
For the reverse direction we use Theorem 3.9 to show that
Φ ∶= {EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ] ∶ (Q, S˜Q) ∈ CPSloc(σ,T )}
is directed upwards, i.e. for EQ[S˜QT ∣ Fσ],EQ¯[S¯Q¯T ∣ Fσ] ∈ Φ there exists EQ̂[ŜQ̂ ∣ Fσ] ∈ Φ
such that E
Q̂
[ŜQ̂
T
∣ Fσ] ≥ EQ[S˜QT ∣ Fσ] ∨ EQ¯[S¯Q¯T ∣ Fσ]. We define
Aσ ∶= {EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ] ≥ EQ¯ [S¯Q¯T ∣ Fσ]} ∈ Fσ .
Let Z = (Z1,Z2) and Z¯ = (Z¯1, Z¯2) be the processes associated to (Q, S˜Q) and (Q, S¯Q¯)
respectively, as in Proposition 2.4. Then we define
dQ̂
dP
=
Ẑ1T
EP [Ẑ1T ] ∶=
1AσZ
1
T + 1Acσ Z¯1T
EP [1AσZ1T + 1Acσ Z¯1T ] , (3.24)
and for σ ≤ t ≤ T ,
Ẑ2t ∶= 1AσZ2t + 1Acσ Z¯2t (3.25)
with corresponding
Ŝ
Q̂
t =
Ẑ2t
Ẑ1t
. (3.26)
Obviously, Ẑ satisfies all requirements from Definition 2.3, i.e., Ẑ ∈ Zloc. Clearly, (1−λ)St ≤
Ŝ
Q̂
t ≤ (1+λ)St for all t ∈ [σ,T ]. For the local martingale property let (τn)n∈N be a localizing
sequence for S˜Q and S¯Q¯. For σ ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T we get
E
Q̂
[(ŜQ̂t )τn ∣ Fs] = EP
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
( Ẑ2t
Ẑ1t
)
τn
Ẑ1T
EP [Ẑ1T ] ∣ Fs
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
EP [Ẑ1T ]
Ẑ1s∧τn
=EP [(1AσZ1t + 1Acσ Z¯2t )τn ∣ Fs] 1
Ẑ1s∧τn
= (1AσEP [(Z2t )τn ∣ Fs] + 1AcσEP [(Z¯2t )τn ∣ Fs]) 1
Ẑ1s∧τn
= (1AσZ2s∧τn + 1Acσ Z¯2s∧τn) 1
Ẑ1s∧τn
= (Ŝs)τn ,
where we used that 1Aσ ,1Acσ are Fσ ⊂ Fs measurable. In particular, by Theorem A.33 of
[21], there exists an increasing sequence (EQn[S˜nT ∣ Fσ])n∈N ⊂ Φ
ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc(0,T )
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ] = ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc(σ,T )
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ] = limn→∞EQn [S˜nT ∣ Fσ] .
(3.27)
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Thus, we obtain by the Theorem of monotone convergence
EQ
0
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc(0,T,λ)
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ]
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= lim
n→∞
EQ
0
[EQn [S˜nT ∣ Fσ]]
≤ sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc(σ,T,λ)
EQ
0
[EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ]] = sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc(0,T,λ)
EQ
0
[EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ]] . (3.28)
The last equality in (3.28) holds due to similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.9.
This concludes the proof of (3.22).
Let now (σn)n∈N be a sequence of stopping times with values in [0, T ] such that σn ↓ σ as
n tends to infinity. We now prove that
lim
n→∞
EQ
0
[F˜σn] = EQ0 [ limn→∞ F˜σn] = EQ0 [F˜σ] .
If the limit exists, then limn→∞EQ
0
[F˜σn] < ∞ for all stopping times 0 ≤ σ ≤ T and
Q0 ∈ Qloc(0, T ). Namely,
lim
n→∞
EQ
0
[F˜σn] = lim
n→∞
EQ
0
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ ess sup(Q,SQ)∈CPSloc EQ [S˜
Q
T
∣ Fσn]
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ ≤ limn→∞EQ0
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ ess sup(Q,SQ)∈CPSloc S˜
Q
σn
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
≤ lim
n→∞
EQ
0
[(1 + λ)Sσn] ≤ lim
n→∞
EQ
0
[1 + λ
1 − λS˜Q0σn ] ≤
1 + λ
1 − λS˜Q00 .
Analogously, we can show that EQ0 [F˜σ] < ∞. Using (3.22), the Fatou’s lemma, and the
fact that (EQ[S˜QT ∣ Ft])σ≤t≤T is right-continuous we obtain
lim
n→∞
sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc
EQ
0
[EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσn]] ≥ limn→∞EQ0 [EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσn]]
≥ EQ
0
[lim inf
n→∞
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσn]] = EQ0 [EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ]] .
(3.29)
Since (3.29) holds for all (Q, S˜Q) ∈ CPSloc we get that
lim
n→∞
EQ
0
[F˜σn] = lim
n→∞
sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc
EQ
0
[EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσn]]
≥ sup
(Q,S˜Q)CPSloc
EQ
0
[EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ]] = EQ0 [F˜σ] ,
(3.30)
where the last equality follows by (3.22). It is left to show the second direction, namely,
lim
n→∞
sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc
EQ
0
[EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσn]] ≤ sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc
EQ
0
[EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσ]] . (3.31)
To this propose, we first show that the family {F˜σn ∶ n ∈ N} is uniformly Q0-integrable.
For n ∈ N we have
EQ
0
[F˜σn] = EQ0
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσn]
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
≤ EQ
0
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc
S˜Qσn
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
≤EQ0 [(1 + λ)Sσn] ≤ EQ0 [1 + λ1 − λS˜Q0σn ] ≤
1 + λ
1 − λS˜Q00 <∞.
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Here we use the property that consistent local price systems are in the bid-ask spread.
Hence by uniform integrability, for all ǫ > 0 there exists δ = δ(ǫ) > 0 such that for A ∈ FT
with Q0(A) < δ we have
EQ0
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσn]1A
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
< ǫ, (3.32)
for all n ∈ N. Define the stopping times (τm)m∈N by
τm ∶= inf {t ≥ 0 ∶ St ≥m} ∧ T. (3.33)
Then we have τm ↑ T , Q0-a.s. as m tends to ∞. In particular, limm→∞Q0(τm = T ) = 1.
Fix ǫ > 0 and let δ ∶= δ(ǫ) > 0 be such that for all A ∈ FT with Q0(A) < δ then (3.32) holds.
There exists M(δ) ∈ N such that Q0(τm < T ) < δ for all m ≥M(δ). Therefore, we obtain
for m ≥M(δ)
sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc
EQ0 [EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσn]] = EQ0
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPS
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσn]
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= EQ0 [F˜σn1{τm=T} + F˜σn1{τm<T}]] ≤ EQ0 [F˜σn1{τm=T}] + ǫ. (3.34)
On {τm = T} we have that Sτmt ≤m for all 0 ≤ t < τm and St = Sτmt , hence F˜σn = F˜σn∧τm =(1+λ)Sσn∧τm = (1+λ)Sσn for all n ∈ N, by Proposition 3.11. Since the process S is ca`dla`g
we get limn→∞ Sσn = Sσ. To conclude the proof, we apply the dominated convergence
theorem by using that (F˜σn)n∈N is uniformly Q0-integrable. Hence by (3.34) we get that
lim
n→∞
sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc
EQ0 [EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fσn]]
≤ lim
n→∞
EQ
0
[F˜σn1{τm=T}] + ǫ
=EQ0 [ limn→∞ F˜σn∧τm1{τm=T}] + ǫ
=EQ
0
[ lim
n→∞
(1 + λ)Sσn∧τm1{τm=T}] + ǫ
=EQ
0
[(1 + λ)Sσ∧τm1{τm=T}] + ǫ
=EQ
0
[F˜σ1{τm=T}] + ǫ
≤EQ0 [F˜σ] + ǫ.
(3.35)
Since ǫ > 0 was arbitrary we obtain equation (3.31).
By Theorem 48 of [18], F˜ has left finite limits if given a uniformly bounded increasing
sequence (σn)n∈N of stopping times we have that limn→∞EQ0 [F˜σn] exists and is finite.
The fact that the limits is finite if it exists is due to the uniform Q0-integrability. Fix
ǫ > 0 and let δ ∶= δ(ǫ) > 0 as above. Note that limn→∞(1 + λ)Sσn exists and is finite since
S is a ca`dla`g process and (σn)n∈N is a uniformly bounded increasing sequence of stopping
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times. Then we have
limsup
n→∞
EQ
0
[F˜σn] ≤ lim sup
n→∞
EQ
0
[F˜σn1{τm=T}] + ǫ
= EQ0 [lim sup
n→∞
F˜σn1{τm=T}] + ǫ
≤ EQ0 [lim sup
n→∞
(1 + λ)Sσn1{τm=T}] + ǫ
= EQ
0
[lim inf
n→∞
(1 + λ)Sσn1{τm=T}] + ǫ
= EQ
0
[lim inf
n→∞
F˜σn1{τm=T}] + ǫ
≤ lim inf
n→∞
EQ
0
[F˜σn] + ǫ.
(3.36)
Since it holds that lim infn→∞EQ
0
[F˜σn] ≤ lim supn→∞EQ0 [F˜σn] and ǫ > 0 was arbitrary,
we can conclude that the limit exists.
By Proposition 3.5, Lemma 3.10 and Theorem 3.13 we obtain that the fundamental price
process is well-defined and admits a ca`dla`g modification.
4 Examples
In this section we provide several examples which illustrate the general results of Section
2 and 3. In Example 4.1 we start by showing a market model under transaction cost
where the asset price, driven by a fractional Brownian motion, has a bubble in the sense
of Definition 3.1. Then we study how the presence of an asset price bubble in a market
model without transaction costs may influence the appearance of a bubble in the analogous
market model with transaction costs, and vice versa. To this purpose, we introduce the
framework of [28] for frictionless market models and consider examples where the asset
price is a semimartingale. In Example 4.5 we illustrate a standard market model such that
there is no bubble, neither with nor without transaction cost. In Example 4.6, the market
model has no bubble under transaction cost but there is a bubble without transaction cost
in the sense of [28]. In Example 4.7 we illustrate how bubble’s birth is already included
in our model.
Example 4.1. This example is based on Example 7.1 of [24]. Let WH be a fractional
Brownian motion with Hurst index 0 <H < 1. We define
Xt ∶= exp(WHt + µt), t ≥ 0,
for µ ≥ 0. Let FX ∶= (FXt )t≥0 be the (completed) natural filtration of the process X. Note
that X admits a consistent price system in the non-local sense on the interval [0, T ] for
all T > 0 by Proposition 4.2 of [25]. Define the stopping time
τ ∶= inf {t ∈ R ∶ Xt = 1
2
} ,
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and set
St ∶=Xτ∧tan t, 0 ≤ t < π
2
, St =
1
2
, t ≥
π
2
.
Define Gt ∶= Ftan t, 0 ≤ t < π/2, and Gpi/2 ∶= F∞. Consider T ≥ π/2. We now show that there
exists no consistent price system in the non-local sense for any λ ∈ (0,1). By contradiction
assume that there exists a consistent price system (Q, S˜Q) for S in the non-local sense for
a λ ∈ (0,1). Then we have
1 − λ
2
≤ S˜
Q
t = EQ [S˜QT ∣ Ft] ≤ 1 + λ2 a.s. (4.1)
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T , and hence also
1 − λ
2(1 + λ) ≤ St ≤
1 + λ
2(1 − λ) , (4.2)
which is not possible because S is not bounded from above for 0 < t < π/2. Thus, we
can conclude that there is no consistent price system in the non-local sense. However, S
satisfies Assumption 1, i.e., for every λ > 0 there exists a consistent local price system for
S. Since X admits for all λ > 0 a consistent local price system (Q, S˜Q) on [0, T ] for all
T > 0, (Q, (S˜Q)τ) is also a consistent local price system for S on [0, T ]. We now show
that there is a bubble in this market model with transaction costs for λ < 1/3. For any
consistent local price system (Q, S˜Q) for S we have
(1 − λ)S0 ≤ S˜Q0 ≤ (1 + λ)S0,
and because S0 = 1
1 − λ
2
≤ S˜
Q
T ≤
1 + λ
2
.
This implies for λ < 1/3
S˜
Q
0
≥ 1 − λ > 1 + λ
2
≥ S˜
Q
T
(4.3)
for all consistent local price systems. Thus, we have
(1 + λ)S0 ≥ ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc
S˜
Q
0
> ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc
EQ[S˜QT ]. (4.4)
Therefore, we can conclude by equation (4.4) that the the asset S has a bubble under
transaction cost at time t = 0.
Remark 4.2. Due to the well-known arbitrage arguments, see [16], the process X in
Example 4.1 cannot be considered to describe asset price dynamics in a market model
without transaction costs. Hence in the case a comparison with an analogous frictionless
market model makes no-sense. Note also that the process X can be replaced by any ca`dla`g
process which is not bounded and admits a consistent local price system on [0, T ] for all
T > 0 and for all λ > 0.
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We now investigate the relation between asset price bubbles in market models with and
without transaction costs. To this purpose we use [28] as reference for the frictionless
market case. We now briefly recall and re-adapt the framework of [28] to be coherent
with our setting outlined in Section 2. In particular, we assume that the asset price S
is given by a ca`dla`g non-negative semimartingale such that Mloc(S) ≠ ∅. Under these
assumptions, NFLVR holds, see [16]. Put S ∶= (B,S). We denote by σL(S) the set of all
R
2-valued processes ν = (ν1t , ν2t )σ≤t≤T which are predictable on ⟦σ,T ⟧ and for which the
stochastic integral process ∫ tσ νsdSs, σ ≤ t ≤ T , is defined in the sense of 2-dimensional
stochastic integration, see [46, Section III.6].
Definition 4.3 (Definition 2.5, [28]). Fix a stopping time 0 ≤ σ ≤ T . The space σLsf(S)
of self-financing strategies (for S) on ⟦σ,T ⟧ consists of all 2-dimensional processes ν which
are predictable on ⟦σ,T ⟧, belong to σL(S), and such that the value process V (ν)(S) of ν
satisfies the self-financing condition
V (ν)(S) ∶= ν ⋅ S = νσ ⋅ Sσ + ∫
σ
νudSu on ⟦σ,T ⟧.
Definition 4.4 (Definition 3.1, [28]). The fundamental value of the asset S at time t ∈
[0, T ] is defined by
S∗t ∶= ess inf {v ∈ L1+(Ft,P) ∶ ∃ν ∈ ∗Lsf+(S) with VT (ν)(S) ≥ ST and Vt(ν)(S) ≤ v,P-a.s.} .
(4.5)
We say that the market model has a strong bubble if S∗ and S are not indistinguishable, i.e.,
if P(S∗σ < Sσ) > 0 for some stopping 0 ≤ σ ≤ T and define the process βNoTC = (βNoTCt )0≤t≤T
by βNoTCt ∶= St − S∗t , t ∈ [0, T ].
Note that Definition 4.4 differs from Definition 3.1 of [28] since we require v ∈ L1+(Ft,P)
in (4.5) to be consistent with Definition 3.1. In this setting the duality from Theorem 3.2
of [43] holds and we get
S∗σ = ess sup
Q∈Mloc(S)
EQ [ST ∣ Fσ] . (4.6)
In the more general framework of [28] it is possible that the duality does not hold, see
Remark 3.11 of [28] and the comment before for more information.
Example 4.5. Let S be a trueQ0-martingale for some probability measureQ0 ∼P. Then,
S˜Q0 ∶= ((1+λ)St)0≤t≤T is a true Q0-martingale and (Q0, S˜Q0) is a consistent price system
in the non-local sense for S. For any stopping time 0 ≤ τ ≤ T we obtain by Proposition
3.3 that
(1 + λ)Sτ ≥ ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Fτ ] ≥ EQ0 [(1 + λ)ST ∣ Fτ ] = (1 + λ)Sτ = (1 + λ)Sτ .
(4.7)
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Hence there is no bubble in the market model with transaction costs. Alternatively, we
can observe that Assumption 2 is satisfied and thus we can apply Proposition 3.11.
From Definition 4.4 we have for any stopping time 0 ≤ τ ≤ T
Sτ ≥ ess sup
Q∈Mloc(S)
EQ [ST ∣ Fτ ] ≥ EQ
0
[ST ∣ Fτ ] = Sτ .
So there is also no bubble in the market model without transaction cost in the sense of
[28].
Example 4.6. In this example we assume that S is given by a three-dimensional inverse
Bessel process, i.e.,
St ∶= ∥Bt∥−1, t ∈ [0, T ], (4.8)
where (Bt)t∈[0,T ] = (B1t ,B2t ,B3t )t∈[0,T ] is a three-dimensional Brownian motion with B0 =(1,0,0) and consider the filtration FS defined by FSt ∶= σ(Ss ∶ s ≤ t). Example 5.2 in [28],
shows that there is a bubble in the market model without transaction cost in the sense
of Definition 4.4. Note that there is also a P-bubble in the sense of [47] as in the case of
a complete market model these definitions coincide. However, by Theorem 5.2 of [24] we
have that for all λ > 0 there exists (Q, S˜Q) ∈ CPS, where S˜Q is a true Q-martingale such
that
(1 − λ)St ≤ S˜Qt ≤ (1 + λ)St, for all t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.9)
In the notation of [24], we say that S˜Q is λ-close to S. In particular, Assumption 2 is
satisfied and thus we obtain by Proposition 3.11 that there is no bubble in any market
model with proportional transaction costs λ > 0. This example shows that proportional
transaction costs can prevent bubbles’ formation.
Example 4.7. This example is based on Example 5.4 of [28]. It illustrates that bubble
birth (see [47], [7]) is naturally included in our model.
Let γ be a random variable with values in (0,1], 0 < P(γ = 1) < 1 and P(γ ≥ t0 > 0) = 1 for
some t0 ∈ (0, T ) and consider the filtration Fγ generated by Ht = 1{γ≤t}, t ∈ [0,1]. Then γ
is a Fγ stopping time, which represents the time when the bubble is born. Further, let W
be a Brownian motion independent of γ. Denote by FW the natural filtration generated
by W and define the filtration F = (Ft)t∈[0,1] by Ft ∶= FWt ∨ Fγt ∨N , t ∈ [0,1], where N
denotes the P-nullsets of FW1 ∨Fγ1 . Then γ is also an F-stopping time. Let S = (St)0≤t≤1
be the unique strong solution to the SDE
dSt = St (µdt + v(t, γ)dWt) , S0 = 1, (4.10)
with µ ∈ R and v ∶ [0,1]2 → [v0,∞) given by
v(t, u) = v0 (1 + 1
1 − t1{u≤t<1}) , (4.11)
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for v0 > 0. Then S is a geometric Brownian motion up to γ. At time γ the term 1/(1 − t)
starts to influence the volatility which explodes until time 1. This implies that S converges
to 0 as t tends to 1. We determine the fundamental value Fσ of S at time σ < 1. In
particular, we see that there is no bubble before time γ but the bubble starts at γ. The
fundamental value Fσ at time σ < 1 is given by
Fσ = (1 + λ)Sσ1{γ>σ}. (4.12)
Note that S1(ω0) = 0 for ω0 ∈ {ω ∈ Ω ∶ γ(ω) ≤ σ(ω)}. We define the strategy ϕ =(ϕ1t , ϕ2t )t∈⟦σ,T ⟧ on ⟦σ,T ⟧ by
(ϕ1t , ϕ2t ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
((1 + λ)Sσ1{γ>σ},0) , for t = σ,
(0,1{γ>σ}) , for σ < t < 1,
(0,1), for t = 1.
That is, using the initial capital (1 + λ)Sσ1{γ>σ} we trade in such a way that we hold the
asset at time 1. If at time σ, γ has already happened, we know that the volatility blows
up and we can buy the asset at time 1 at price 0. However, if γ happens strictly after
σ we do not know if the volatility will blow up and thus we buy the asset at time σ at
price (1 + λ)Sσ in order to hold the asset at time 1. As this strategy ϕ super-replicates
the position (0,1), we conclude that Fσ ≤ (1 + λ)Sσ1{γ>σ}.
For the reverse direction, “≥” we use the duality from Proposition 3.4. By Example 5.4 of
[28] we get
ess sup
Q∈Mloc(S)
EQ [S1 ∣ Fσ] = Sσ1{γ>σ}.
From this we obtain
Fσ = ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc
EQ [S1 ∣ Fσ] ≥ ess sup
Q∈Mloc(S)
EQ [(1 + λ)S1 ∣ Fσ] = (1 + λ)Sσ1{γ>σ}.
Indeed, we have
Fσ = (1 + λ)Sσ1{γ>σ}.
This implies that Fσ = (1 + λ)Sσ on {σ < γ} and Fσ = 0 on {σ ≥ γ}. In particular, we can
conclude that γ is then the time at which the bubble is born.
5 Impact of transaction costs on bubble’s formation
In this section we study whether transaction costs can prevent bubbles’ formation and
their impact on bubbles’ size.
In the setting of [28] outlined in Section 4, we assume that the asset price S is a semi-
martingale and that Mloc(S) ≠ ∅. At time t ∈ [0, T ] we obtain by Lemma 3.12 that
(1 + λ)St ≥ Ft = ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Ft] ≥ ess sup
Q∈Mloc(S)
EQ[(1 + λ)ST ∣ Ft] = (1 + λ)S∗t .
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In particular, we have
βt = (1 + λ)St − Ft ≤ (1 + λ)⎛⎝St − ess supQ∈Mloc(S)EQ[ST ∣ Ft]
⎞
⎠ = (1 + λ)βNoTCt . (5.1)
From (5.1) we immediately obtain for t ∈ [0, T ] that if βNoTCt = 0, then βt = 0 and that
βNoTCt > 0 if βt > 0 for t ∈ [0, T ]. Let βNoTCt ≠ 0. Then
βt
βNoTCt
≤ 1 + λ, (5.2)
which means that the quotient of the bubbles is bounded by the factor (1+λ). Furthermore,
we have
−λβNoTC ≤ βNoTCt − βt ≤ βNoTCt . (5.3)
It is easy to see that both bounds in (5.3) can be obtained. In Example 4.7 we get
βt − βNoTCt = (1 + λ)St1{γ≤t} − St1{γ≤t} = λSt1{γ≤t} = λβNoTCt .
Furthermore, we have in Example 4.6 that βt ≡ 0 and thus we obtain the equality on the
right hand side of (5.3). Further, we note that
(1 + λ)βNoTCt − βt
=(1 + λ)⎛⎝St − ess supQ∈Mloc(S)EQ[ST ∣ Ft]
⎞
⎠ − (1 + λ)St + ess sup(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSlocEQ [S˜
Q
T
∣ Ft]
= ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc
EQ [S˜QT ∣ Ft] − (1 + λ) ess sup
Q∈Mloc(S)
EQ[ST ∣ Ft] =∶∆t,T (λ). (5.4)
By rearranging equation (5.4) we obtain then
βt = (1 + λ)βNoTCt −∆t,T (λ). (5.5)
Clearly, it holds ∆t,T (λ) ∈ ⟦0, (1 + λ)βNoTCt ⟧. Consider Example 4.6, where S is a 3-
dimensional inverse Bessel process with respect to P and set t = 0. Then β0 = 0 and
∆t,T (λ) = sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc
EQ [S˜QT ] − (1 + λ) sup
Q∈Mloc(S)
EQ [ST ]
= (1 + λ)S0 − (1 + λ)EP [ST ]
= 2(1 + λ)(1 −Φ( 1√
T
)) ,
(5.6)
where Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution,
see [20]. For T tending to infinity, then ∆t,T (λ) tends to (1 + λ).
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Remark 5.1. From equation (5.1) we can see that if a market model without transaction
costs has no asset price bubble, then the analogue market model with transaction has no
asset price bubble either. In other words, the introduction of transaction costs into a market
cannot generate asset price bubbles. Conversely, by (5.1) it follows that, if a market model
with transaction costs has an asset price bubble, the corresponding frictionless market
model has an asset price bubble as well.
In our model the introduction of transaction costs can possibly prevent the occurrence of
an asset price bubble. This can be seen in Example 4.6 where we have an asset price
bubble in the sense of Definition 4.4 but no bubble in presence of transaction costs with
respect to Definition 3.1. However, Example 4.7 shows that it is possible to have an asset
price bubble in both market models, with and without transaction costs. In particular, the
presence of transaction costs does not guarantee the absence of asset price bubbles.
6 Bid bubble
The lack of symmetry between buying, holding and selling a share of an asset suggests
to study separately bubbles for the bid price and the ask price. In Section 3 we have
introduced an asset price bubble for the ask price. If we wish to similarly define an asset
price bubble for the bid price, a possible approach would be to define the fundamental
value by the sub-replication price of holding one share of the asset at time T . However,
in our setting it is not possible to use the common definition of sub-replication prices
because our definition of trading strategies allows to throw money away, see [49]. This
can be illustrated by considering the classical definition of the sub-replication price, see
[33]. Denote by A(x) the the set of self-financing admissible trading strategies according
to Definition 2.2 of [33]. For a derivative ZT ∈ L
0
+(F ,P) we have that the sub-replication
price c0 at time 0 is given by
c0 = sup{x ∈ R ∶ ∃(α0, α) ∈ A(x), x + ∫ T
0
αt ⋅ dSt ≤ ZT} , (6.1)
If ZT ∈ L
1
+(F ,Q) for all Q ∈Mloc(S) is bounded from above we have by Theorem 8.2 of
[33] that
c0 = inf
Q∈Mloc(S)
EQ [ZT ] . (6.2)
As we can throw money away in our setting, the supremum in (6.1) will always be infinite.
Alternatively, we can consider the claim XT = (0,−1) and define the fundamental value
by the super-replication price for XT . By applying Theorem 1.5 of [50] (see Theorem A.1
in the Appendix) we obtain that in this case the fundamental price would coincide with
sup(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSEQ [−S˜QT ]. However, the super-replication price is well-defined in this case
only if Assumption 2 is in force, which implies that we only allow consistent price systems
in the non-local sense and thus we get by Proposition 3.11 that
sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPS
EQ [−S˜QT ] = − inf
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPS
EQ [S˜QT ] = −(1 − λ)S0. (6.3)
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If we consider the case of consistent local price systems, we need strategies which are
admissible in the the nume´raire-based sense. In particular, a claim XT = (X1T ,X2T ) can
only be super-replicated by a strategy ϕ = (ϕ1t , ϕ2t )0≤t≤T admissible in the nume´raire-based
sense, i.e. ϕT =XT , if
X1T + (X2T )+(1 − λ)ST − (X2T )−(1 + λ)ST ≥ −M, (6.4)
for a constant M > 0. But for XT = (0,−1) equation (6.4) can only be fulfilled if ST is
bounded. This is a strong restriction and in general not fulfilled.
Let us consider another approach. The fundamental value in the sense of Definition 3.1
coincides with the super-replication price of holding one share of the asset at time T . For a
bid-bubble we want to compare the fundamental value with the bid-price (1−λ)S. As the
bid-price is the selling price, it seems reasonable to introduce the definition of fundamental
price by considering the liquidation value of one share of the asset, i.e., to super-replicate
the cash position XT = ((1 − λ)ST ,0).
Definition 6.1. The fundamental value for the bid-price F bid = (F bidt )t∈[0,T ] of an asset
S at time t ∈ [0, T ] in a market model with proportional transaction costs 0 < λ < 1 is
defined by
F bidt ∶= ess inf {Xt ∈ L1+(Ft,Qloc) ∶ ∃ϕ ∈ V loct,T (Xt, λ) with ϕt = (Xt,0) and ϕT = ((1 − λ)ST ,0)}.
By Proposition 3.5 we obtain that
F bidt = ess sup
(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc(σ,T )
EQ [(1 − λ)ST ∣ Ft] . (6.5)
It is easy to see that F bidt ≤ Ft for all t ∈ [0, T ]. However, it is hard to determine
sup(Q,S˜Q)∈CPSloc(0,T )EQ[(1 − λ)ST ] = supQ∈Qloc EQ[(1 − λ)ST ] explicitly, because we do
not know the behavior of ST under a measure Q ∈ Qloc.
A Super-replication Theorems
For sake of completeness we provide the super-replication theorems (Theorem 1.4, Theo-
rem 1.5) of [50]. Note that Theorem 1.5 of [50] coincides with Theorem 4.1 of [11]. We
denote by AM(Xσ, σ, T,λ) (resp. AlocM (Xσ , σ, T,λ) the set of all terminal values of self-
financing trading strategies ϕ, ϕ ∈ VM(Xσ, σ, T,λ) (resp. ϕ ∈ V locM (Xσ, σ, T,λ)). We use the
notation Aσ,T (Xσ , λ) = ⋃M AM(Xσ, σ, T,λ) (resp. Alocσ,T (Xσ , λ) = ⋃M AlocM (Xσ , σ, T,λ)).
Theorem A.1 (Theorem 1.5, [50]). Let Assumption 2 hold. We consider a contingent
claim XT = (X1T ,X2T ) which pays X1T many units of the bond and X2T many units of the
risky asset at time T . The random variable XT is assumed to satisfy
X1T + (X2T )+ (1 − λ)ST − (X2T )− (1 + λ)ST ≥ −M(1 + ST ),
for some M > 0. Then the following assertions are equivalent
(i) There is a self-financing trading strategy ϕ with ϕ ≡ 0 on ⟦0, σ⟧ and ϕT = (X1T ,X2T )
which is admissible in a nume´raire-free sense.
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(ii) For every (Q, S˜Q) ∈ CPS(σ,T ) we have
EQ [X1T +X2T S˜QT ] ≤ 0. (A.1)
Theorem A.2 (Theorem 1.4, [50]). Let Assumption 1 hold. We consider a contingent
claim XT = (X1T ,X2T ) which pays X1T many units of the bond and X2T many units of the
risky asset at time T . The random variable XT is assumed to satisfy
X1T + (X2T )+ (1 − λ)ST − (X2T )− (1 + λ)ST ≥ −M, (A.2)
for some M > 0. Then the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) There is a self-financing trading strategy ϕ on ⟦σ,T ⟧ with ϕ ≡ 0 on ⟦0, σ⟧ and ϕT =(X1T ,X2T ) which is admissible in a nume´raire-based sense.
(ii) For every (Q, S˜Q) ∈ CPSloc(σ,T ) we have
EQ [X1T +X2T S˜QT ] ≤ 0. (A.3)
Note that in Theorem A.2 we consider the claim XT = (X1T ,X2T ) instead of XT = (X1T ,0)
as in Theorem 1.4 of [50]. However, the proof is similar. For details on the proof, we refer
to [48].
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